Violent extremism in South Africa: assessing the current threat by Schoeman, Albertus & Cachalia, Raeesah Cassim
Transnational extremist groups are expanding their networks across the globe. South Africa has 
been linked to al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda and, more recently, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, 
with 60–100 South Africans estimated to have joined the group. The country also has a history 
of violent extremism stemming from domestic grievances that remain prevalent. Based on 
interviews with 40 stakeholders, this brief examines the threat that violent extremism poses to 
South Africa and the government’s response to this challenge. 
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Recent years have shown the threat of violent extremism to be 
increasingly fluid in nature, and this development has challenged 
states to review their approach to the issue. While South Africa has not 
experienced a terrorist attack in over a decade, it is not immune to the 
global challenges posed by violent extremism. 
In the years following the 9/11 attacks in the United States (US), 
several allegations have emerged linking South Africa to international 
extremist organisations, along with incidents suggesting that South 
Africa has served as an operational base for individuals connected 
to extremist groups abroad. In addition, terror alerts issued by the 
US Diplomatic Mission to South Africa over the last two years have 
caused concern over potential attacks in the country. In 2014 the 
reach of international extremism became evident when reports 
emerged of South Africans travelling to the Middle East to join the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). 
South Africa has also faced local extremist threats, with the last 
known plot thwarted in 2012 when a far-right group planned an attack 
on the African National Congress’ National Conference in Manguang.1 
Collectively, these events have raised a number of questions around 
violent extremism in South Africa and the state’s capacity to respond. 
While the threats previously posed by domestic extremist groups 
have diminished, new concerns have emerged relating to international 
extremist groups. 
This policy brief provides an overview of South Africa’s post-apartheid 
experience of violent extremism and assesses the threat that violent 
extremism currently poses to the country. It also provides a brief 
overview of government responses to the challenge and highlights 
emerging concerns for violent extremism in South Africa. 
This policy brief examines preventing violent extremism as it relates 
to South Africa as an actor in the global community. This is one of a 
series of three focusing on violent extremism and South Africa.
Methodology 
This study used publicly available documentation and qualitative, 
semi-structured interviews to explore the threat of violent extremism 
in South Africa. Court documents, research on extremist groups in 
South Africa and media reports were studied. Forty interviews were 
conducted in September and October 2016. 
The study used a purposive sampling approach, selecting respondents 
on the basis of their familiarity with the topics of extremism, security, 
and South African politics and society. Respondents included 
government officials, civil society members, security analysts, 
academics, members of the diplomatic corps and community leaders.
  Government and civil society 
should endeavour to better 
understand the nature of 
violent extremism, the threat 
it poses and the ways in 
which it may evolve, to 
ensure adequate responses 
are developed.
 The state and civil society 
should emphasise anti- 
corruption policies.
 The up-skilling of intelligence 
and security personnel needs 
to be prioritised in order to 
deal with the evolving nature 
of the threats.
 Government and civil society 
should find effective ways 
of fostering greater social 
cohesion and inclusivity.
 Youth must be encouraged 
to constructively engage 
with the government and 
broader society regarding 
the challenges they face. 
Education is key.
 Government should increase 
engagement and cooperation 
with foreign states on the 
question of violent extremism.
 Government and communities 
should continue to work 
together to address 
radicalisation and recruitment.
 Government and the media 
should work towards 
responsible public 
communication on issues 
around violent extremism.
Recommendations
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Among the government officials interviewed were 
members of the various security and intelligence 
agencies tasked with national security at different 
operational levels, including the State Security Agency, 
the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and 
units within the South African Police Service (SAPS). 
Officials from the Department of International Relations 
and Cooperation were also interviewed. Due to the 
sensitive nature of the topic, interviewees were offered 
the option of remaining anonymous.
Terminology
Violent extremism and terrorism are problematic 
concepts without universally accepted definitions. 
For the purposes of this brief, violent extremism is 
understood as ‘a willingness to use or support the use 
of violence to further particular beliefs, including those 
of a political, social or ideological nature and may 
include acts of terrorism’.2 
With regard to terrorism, there are three common 
elements generally agreed upon that will define 
terrorism as used in this brief. These are: 1) the use or 
threat of violence, 2) directed at civilian or government 
targets, 3) for the purpose of intimidation or coercion 
for political, religious or ideological ends.3 The intent 
behind the perpetration of an act and the methods 
employed are key to determining whether an act is 
terrorist or criminal in nature.4 
Historical context of violent extremism in SA
The far right
South Africa has an extensive and complex history 
of far-right extremism, dating back to the 1970s. Far-
right groups in the country have traditionally been 
based on Afrikaner nationalism, with many aimed at 
establishing an independent Afrikaner nation state, built 
on the notion of a shared language and religion, and 
a common Afrikaner history.5 Crucial to the ideology 
of the far right is their shared Calvinist religion, often 
mixed with elements of prophecy and notions of a divine 
right to a ‘Boer’ Republic.6 Throughout the apartheid 
era, various far-right groups carried out bomb attacks 
targeting black communities, liberal politicians and 
multiracial institutions.7 Such attacks continued into 
South Africa’s democratic era post-1994. 
South Africa’s most prominent far-right group is 
the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB). In the 
early 1980s members of the AWB were convicted of 
terrorism after terrorist plots had been uncovered.8 In 
the build-up to the 1994 elections the group carried 
out multiple attacks aimed at destabilising the country 
and disrupting its first multiracial elections – most 
notably, with a series of bombings on the eve of the 
elections that killed 20 people.9 
Despite their failure to achieve their goals over the past 
two decades, members of the far right continue to 
hold secessionist sentiments or notions of reinstating 
white rule. Between 1994 and 2002 far-right groups 
were involved in various isolated incidents, including 
the bombing of a mosque and attempts to steal 
weapons and military equipment.10 The largest 
attack carried out during this time was the so-called 
‘Worcester bombing’ in 1996 where members of the 
Boere Aanvalstroepe, a far-right offshoot of the AWB, 
detonated two bombs, killing a woman and three 
children and injuring 67 people.11 
In 2002 the far right resurfaced when the so-called 
Boeremag detonated eight bombs in Soweto, 
Johannesburg, seven of which destroyed railway lines 
while the eighth destroyed part of a mosque.12 Twenty-
three suspects were charged with treason and acts of 
terrorism, sabotage and the possession of explosives 
and firearms.13 In total, 3 000 kg of explosives were 
seized in the arrests.14 
In the marathon Boeremag trial it was revealed that 
the group had planned to assassinate South African 
icon Nelson Mandela in a roadside bombing.15 In the 
chaos that would presumably have ensued following 
Mandela’s death, the group planned to seize power 
through a military coup.16 Its plan to prompt a race war 
was based on the prophecies of an Anglo-Boer War 
era seer, Siener van Rensburg, who envisioned a future 
war between white and black in South Africa and 
prophesised the return of white rule following the war.17 
This ideological foundation played an important role 
South Africa has an extensive and 
complex history of far-right extremism, 
dating back to the 1970s
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in recruiting followers and forming the belief that they 
would indeed be able to seize control of the state. At 
the time, the Boeremag came to be seen as a primary 
threat to the survival of South Africa’s democracy.18 
People Against Gangsterism and Drugs
People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (Pagad) 
formed in 1995 as a popular movement promoting 
the empowerment of communities in opposition to 
the high levels of violent crime and drug usage in 
the Western Cape. Frustrated with the government’s 
inability to deal with these issues, the group initially 
staged peaceful demonstrations aimed at pressuring 
the government to respond more firmly to  
its concerns.19 
Towards the end of 1996 Pagad’s approach 
moved towards vigilantism and its rhetoric became 
increasingly militant. A turning point was reached 
when Pagad publically murdered Hard Livings gang 
leader Rashaad Staggie in a mass march on his 
house.20 Analysts attributed this militant change 
to the growing influence of the fundamentalist 
group Qibla.21 Qibla was a trained militant group 
formed in the 1980s that was inspired by the Iranian 
Revolution22 and sought to implement a similar 
system of Islamic rule in South Africa.23 Analysts 
believe that members associated with Qibla pushed 
Pagad’s founders out of the organisation, leading to 
splits and a struggle for control of the group.24 
Between 1996 and 1998 Pagad’s activities became 
more violent as its militant arm, the G-Force, carried 
out attacks on restaurants, shopping centres, gay 
nightclubs and the investigative units and judges 
involved in cases dealing with Pagad members. The 
unit reportedly received military-style training and 
functioned on the basis of cells.25 The influence of 
Qibla also brought about changes in the focus of  
the group. 
Towards 1999 and 2000 Pagad’s attacks increasingly 
targeted public spaces and symbols representative of 
US interests – as seen in the bombing of the Planet 
Hollywood restaurant – rather than drug dealers and 
gangsters. Its radical views also led to confrontations 
with members of the Muslim community who 
criticised its views and militant rhetoric, resulting in 
members of Pagad allegedly carrying out attacks on 
various Muslim community leaders.26 
From December 1999 several Pagad members 
were sentenced on charges of murder, attempted 
murder, illegal possession of firearms and theft, 
with Pagad’s national coordinator, Abdus-Salaam 
Ebrahim, sentenced to five years in jail for public 
violence. Between 1996 and 2000 Pagad’s G-Force 
had carried out an estimated 472 attacks involving 
shootings, petrol and pipe bombs, and grenades.27 
After a raid on a G-Force cell in November 2000, 
in which the group was caught in possession of 
explosives, the bomb attacks stopped.28 
Experiences with international extremist 
organisations
Evidence on South Africa’s experiences with 
international extremist organisations largely relates 
to individuals associated with these extremist groups 
using the country to hide out, plan operations and 
potentially source funding. For example, there have 
been instances where individuals with links to al-
Qaeda and al-Shabaab have been found in hiding in 
South Africa, leading to claims that the country has 
been used as a safe haven for extremists and their 
activities.29 Such evidence is, however, limited and 
difficult to verify, and can therefore not be held as an 
indication of larger trends or patterns. Selected cases 
of note are discussed below.
Henry Okah, the alleged leader of the Movement 
for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), 
lived periodically in South Africa from 2003 and 
reportedly coordinated attacks in Nigeria and 
smuggling operations from South Africa.30 In 2010 
Okah was arrested in Johannesburg, a day after two 
car bombings in Abuja – which he was found to have 
orchestrated – had killed 12 people.31 In 2013 he was 
convicted in South Africa on 13 terrorism-related 
charges for his role in the Abuja and Warri bombings.32 
The success of the Okah trial was significant in 
demonstrating South Africa’s commitment to the 
suppression of terrorism and its ability to honour its 
obligations under international law.33 
Pagad carried out about 472 attacks 
involving shootings, petrol and pipe 
bombs, and grenades
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A further case of interest is that of the so-called 
‘White Widow’, Samantha Lewthwaite. Lewthwaite is 
wanted by Interpol and Kenyan authorities34 for her 
links to al-Qaeda and her alleged role in planning an 
attack in Mombasa in 2012. Between 2008 and 2010 
Lewthwaite lived and worked in South Africa using a 
false South African passport. She first entered South 
Africa in July 2008 and was deported less than a 
year later, only to return three months later under a 
false identity.35 With fake documents and an assumed 
identity, Lewthwaite reportedly signed at least four 
rental leases in the Johannesburg suburbs and 
secured loans from various South African banks.36 
A convicted fraudster admitted to securing the fake 
documents for Lewthwaite and her two children 
with the help of corrupt Home Affairs officials for an 
amount of R20 000.37 
Similarly, in October 1999 police arrested Khalfan 
Khamis Mohamed, a Tanzanian wanted for his role 
in the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and 
Tanzania, in Cape Town.38 Before the attack Mohamed 
US embassy 



































Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, senior member of Al-Qaeda and leader 
of the East African branch, is killed in Somalia and is found with a 
South African passport 
Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, senior member 
of Al-Qaeda and leader of the East African 
branch, is killed in Somalia and is found with a 
South African passport 
Mohammed Yassar Gulzar, a key planner in the plot to blow up flights 
using liquid explosives in 2006, enters the UK from South Africa with 
a fake South African passport after living in South Africa for two years 
Henry Okah is sentenced to 24 years in jail on 13 charges 
of terrorism 
An al-Qaeda suspect is 
arrested in Iraq reportedly 
plotting attacks in South Africa 
during the Soccer World Cup 
Henry Okah is arrested in 
Johannesburg accused of 
planning car bombings in 
Abuja, Nigeria 
Intelligence Minister Ronnie 
Kasrils warns of al-Qaeda 
members seeking refuge in 
SA and possibly attempting 
setting up networks 
Samantha Lewthwaite, “White 
Widow”, reportedly enters 




in South Africa 
Haroon Rashid Aswat 
is arrested in Zambia 
after leaving South 





Rashid is arrested 
and is allegedly 
extraordinarily 
rendered to Pakistan 
Ibrahim Tantoush’s 
extradition to 
Libya falls through 
after the case 
is dropped after 
presidential consent 
for extradition is not 
received 
Saud Memon is arrested in 
South Africa and allegedly 
extraordinary rendered 
Ibrahim Tantoush, an 
alleged al-Qaeda financier, 
is deported from Australia to 
South Africa in possession 
of a fraudulent South African 
passport 
Zubair Ismail and 
Feroz Ganchi are 
arrested in Pakistan 
reportedly in an al-
Qaeda safe house 
with senior al-Qaeda 
commander Ahmed 
Khalfan Ghailani 
An alleged terrorist 
plot is reportedly 





Tantoush is arrested 
for possession of fake 
documents. Libya 
requests extradition 
on charges of 
stealing gold for terror 
financing 
Khalfan Khamis Mohamed is 
arrested in Cape Town
A 15-year-old girl 
is taken off a flight 
in Cape Town after 
trying to fly to Syria 
to join ISIS. A second 
teenage girl reportedly 
attempts the same 
Around a dozen South 
Africans are reportedly 
deported from Turkey 
for attempting to reach 
Islamic State territory 
US, Australia 
and UK release 
warnings of 
possible terrorist 
attacks in SA 
Ibrahim and Fatima Patel, 
and Brandon and Tony 
Thulsie are arrested on 
suspicion of planning 
terrorist activity 
Two suspects allegedly 
linked to ISIS travelling 
from Turkey to South 
Africa are detained in 
Turkey and South Africa
Figure 1: Chronology of events related to international extremist groups in SA
Source: Institute for Security Studies
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had obtained a visitor’s visa from the South African High Commission in Dar 
es Salaam and, once in South Africa, applied for asylum and refugee status 
under a false name.39 He lived and worked in Cape Town for a year before 
being discovered by an agent of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
There have been various instances where fraudulent South African passports 
have been found in the possession of al-Qaeda members.40 When Fazul 
Abdullah Mohammed, leader of al-Qaeda’s East African branch, was killed 
in Somalia in 2011, he was found carrying a South African passport.41 
This raises questions regarding the collusion of government officials in the 
production and dissemination of these documents. 
The large number of illegal migrants in South Africa highlights the 
challenges around effective border control and raises questions around 
the ability of security forces to identify and track extremists potentially 
operating in the country. In 2005 it was discovered that Haroon Rashid 
Aswat, a British citizen wanted in the US for alleged links to al-Qaeda, was 
living in South Africa.42 During discussions between the United Kingdom 
(UK) and the US, initially over his rendition, South African authorities 
reportedly lost track of Aswat,43 who was later arrested after trying to 
enter Zambia from Zimbabwe.44 
The issue of porous borders and ungoverned areas in the broader Southern 
African region also raises concerns,45 with speculation ranging from alleged 
al-Qaeda training camps in northern Mozambique46 and allegations of 
cells operating in Namibia47 and Botswana48 to terrorist financing involving 
gemstones in Madagascar.49 Although the authenticity of such claims are 
difficult to establish and beyond the scope of this brief, they highlight the 
broader regional context of porous borders and diminished state capacity 
in which South Africa finds itself and which may facilitate extremist activity. 
Similarly, there have been various allegations around South Africans 
financing terrorism, although none have proven conclusive. However, 
as seen in the cases of Lewthwaite and Aswat,50 suspects may hide 
among local communities that unwittingly support them. Along with 
this, there have been claims to suggest that charitable donations from 
unsuspecting groups and individuals may sometimes be funnelled to 
extremist groups abroad.51 
In 2004 then national police commissioner Jackie Selebi told the 
Parliamentary Committee on Safety and Security that authorities had arrested 
and deported several suspects allegedly linked to al-Qaeda days before 
elections in South Africa, and claimed that they had held ‘evil intentions’ 
against the country.52 Then safety and security minister Charles Nqakula 
confirmed that these operations existed and would have disrupted elections.53 
There have been various allegations around South 
Africans financing terrorism, although none have 
proven conclusive
GLOBALLY, GOVERNMENT 
CORRUPTION IS A 
MOTIVATING FACTOR 
BEHIND RADICALISATION
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Figure 2: Transnational nature of violent extremism
Source: Institute for Security Studies
Factors contributing to vulnerability
Several factors may contribute to a state’s vulnerability 
to extremist attacks, as a target for the purposes of 
radicalisation and recruitment or as an operational base 
for extremists. These may include political and socio-
economic challenges within a society, the marginalisation 
of minority groups and factors related to ideology or 
geopolitics.54 Weaknesses in governance,55 security56 and 
intelligence structures57 may also play a role.
Globally, government corruption is recognised as 
a motivating factor behind radicalisation, and is 
increasingly used by extremist groups to foment 
dissent against the state and mistrust of government.58 
Generally this narrative is built around calling into 
question the legitimacy of the government or political 
system and consequently advocating for an upheaval 
of the political system.59 This can particularly be seen 
as a motivating factor in the actions of the far right. 
Within the South African context, corruption is also 
an enabling factor that allows for extremist activity in 
terms of planning operations. Corruption compromises 
security, for example through aiding extremists’ entry 
into the country and undermining the capability of the 
security forces to address threats. It could further aid 
in the transfer of funds to extremist groups.
The politicisation of key roles in South Africa’s security 
cluster is of specific concern. Political appointments 
often result in inadequate leadership, which has a 
compromising effect on security agencies.60 The impact 
of such appointments could also lead to morale breaking 
down within institutions and skills levels dropping when 
the necessary leadership and initiative are not provided.61 
Ungoverned areas are generally regarded as safe 
havens for violent extremists. However, entirely 
ungoverned areas are not necessarily ideal for planning 
and coordination purposes. For such activities, 
infrastructure and resources such as transportation, 
communications networks and financial institutions 
are crucial. South Africa’s established infrastructure, 
coupled with an overstretched police service, may 
make the country an attractive option for the planning 
of operations or for those seeking a hideout that 
provides the necessary resources and allows them to 
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Haroon Rashid Aswat
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Findings: assessing the current threat
In assessing the threat of violent extremism to South 
Africa, two points are considered: the possibility of 
South Africa becoming a target for extremist attacks, 
and the threat of activities related to violent extremism, 
including radicalisation, training, recruitment and 
the use of the country as a base for the planning of 
extremist activities. The threat contains a domestic 
component stemming from local grievances, as noted 
with Pagad and the Boeremag, and an international 
component linked to the agendas of global extremist 
organisations such as al-Qaeda and ISIS. 
The far right
Far-right groups have been vocal in their dissatisfaction 
with the government and the state of post-1994 
South Africa. The ideologies of groups such as the 
Kommandokorps are still strongly fuelled by racism 
and espouse principles of racial segregation hostile 
to transformation and coexistence.63 Such groups 
have turned inwards and mobilised around common 
grievances as a result of what they perceive to be 
political and economic alienation. A seized Boeremag 
document outlined the high levels of crime post-
1994, affirmative action policies and rising white 
unemployment as issues around which it could attract 
popular support.64 
Respondents argued that while far-right groups 
are unlikely to gain support from the majority of 
Afrikaners, the issues noted by the group continue 
to affect segments of the Afrikaner community, many 
of whom feel politically alienated and marginalised. 
Respondents, however, regarded the threat emanating 
from the far right as low. Among the reasons for this 
is that since the dismantling of the Boeremag and the 
death of AWB leader Eugene Terre’blanche, the far 
right is considered to be in disarray.65 Although there 
is evidence of attempts at organising and training 
taking place among individual groups,66 support for 
the far right is seen as minimal and diffused among 
many smaller groups with little coordination and no 
central leadership. 
Further, what set the Boeremag apart from other 
far-right groups was that some of its members 
were serving officers in the post-apartheid SANDF, 
which provided it with access to resources and 
operational planning capabilities.67 This is no longer 
the case, as respondents agreed that South Africa’s 
police and military structures have been significantly 
transformed. The majority of respondents agreed that 
the only potential threat from the far right was a ‘lone 
wolf’ attack. Such an incident would undoubtedly 
enflame racial tensions, but would be unlikely to 
endanger state security.
Pagad
The release of Pagad members from prison in recent 
years has raised questions around whether the group 
will return to the strategies it used during the 1990s. 
The structural issues that led to the rise of Pagad, such 
as high levels of crime, corruption and the failure of the 
government to effectively deal with gang violence on 
the Cape Flats, remain prevalent. 
Although the group is reorganising, the consensus 
among respondents was that Pagad does not pose a 
major security threat.68 Respondents argued that, now 
aware of the repercussions of violent tactics, Pagad 
members appeared to be acting more cautiously in 
terms of both rhetoric and strategy, especially since 
former convicts are kept under surveillance after being 
released.69 This analysis was confirmed by a leaked 
2009 intelligence briefing assessing the risk posed by 
Pagad, which revealed that state security agencies 
continue to monitor the group.70 Although the report 
indicated that the group still resorts to intimidation 
to deter drug peddlers, Pagad has become more 
cooperative with police and thus far has not resorted 
to the kind of violence seen in the late 1990s.71 
Respondents also argued that Pagad had operated 
in a very different context during its prime.72 South 
Africa’s new constitutional dispensation means that 
incitement and hate speech are far less tolerable than 
they may have been during the early post-apartheid 
era. Recognising the changing landscape, the group 
appears to be attempting to make gains using other 
avenues. These include partnerships with political 
parties sympathetic to its cause and engaging relevant 
government organs, such as the Department of Justice 
While the possibility exists, the threat to 
South Africa in terms of an ISIS attack is 
considered low
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and Constitutional Development, for assistance.73 The group’s activities 
may, nonetheless, lead to low-level violence,74 in terms of confrontations75 
between the group and gangs in the Western Cape, where Pagad’s 
activities are largely concentrated. 
International extremist groups
The most prominent concerns currently centre on threats posed by 
international extremist groups such as ISIS. The incidents reported 
above indicate the reasons for concern over their role in South Africa. 
Furthermore, in 2014 reports emerged of South Africans traveling to Iraq 
and Syria to join ISIS.76 Respondents estimated that 60 to 100 South 
Africans had left to join the group and that more than half had since 
returned.77 These events have led to fears of radicalisation, recruitment 
and potential attacks within the country.
Findings indicate that, while the possibility exists, the threat to South Africa 
in terms of an attack is considered low. Respondents pointed to various 
reasons for this, primarily around the question of intent. Many contended 
that South Africa’s foreign policy choices made it a less likely target given its 
history of non-intervention and its support for various liberation movements 
globally. Analysts argue that extremism is often linked to certain foreign 
policy decisions.78 The US’ invasion of Iraq is one example of this. South 
Africa’s lack of interventionist policies may mean that extremist groups do 
not consider the country a target. As illustrated by al-Shabaab’s attacks on 
Kenya, groups often target foreign states on the basis of retaliation.79 
The case of the so-called ‘Thulsie twins’ is a rare instance of alleged 
plans to target structures on South African soil. In July 2016 South Africa’s 
Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation arrested brothers Brandon-Lee 
and Tony-Lee Thulsie, who are South African citizens, on charges related 
to terrorism. It is alleged that after failed attempts to travel to Syria to join 
ISIS, the pair began planning attacks on US and Jewish targets in South 
Africa.80 The case is ongoing. 
Respondents argued that domestic factors found to play a role in other 
states are not prevalent in South Africa. In contrast with patterns observed 
in Europe, Muslims in South Africa are not viewed as an immigrant 
community but rather as part of South Africa’s diverse make-up, with a 
long and enduring history in the country.81 Further, those recruited by ISIS 
emerged from stable socio-economic backgrounds. Factors that are now 
commonly associated with radicalisation, such as marginalisation, political 
and religious suppression or relative deprivation, thus did not appear to 
play a role in this context. Respondents explained further that political 
inclusion meant that outlets for grievances were found within political or 
civic structures, thus preventing extreme mobilisation.82 
The general consensus among both civil society and government 
respondents was that ISIS and its violent ideology have found scant 
support or sympathy within the South African Muslim community. This is 
attributed to the predominantly moderate Islamic tradition in South Africa. 
ISIS IS NOT WIDELY 
SUPPORTED IN SA’S 
MUSLIM COMMUNITY
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Although pockets of conservatism exist, these are not 
generally linked to militancy.83 Respondents pointed 
out that South Africa’s Muslim authorities were vocal  
in their condemnation of ISIS and that the group  
had not managed to exert influence in mainstream 
Muslim organisations.84 
In assessing what motivated individuals to join ISIS, 
respondents pointed to a sense of solidarity with the 
suffering of Muslims in countries such as Palestine, Iraq 
and Syria. This played a large role when considering 
the helplessness normally experienced in terms of ‘a 
sense of global injustice’85 and the carnage playing out 
abroad. ISIS ostensibly offers individuals the opportunity 
to effect change on the ground. Along with these social 
underpinnings, skewed religious imperatives may also 
have played a strong role.86 Findings further indicated 
that a sense of idealism around the romanticised idea of 
a utopian Islamic state, coupled with adventurism, was 
often a driving force specifically among young recruits.87 
Respondents pointed out that although there have been 
reports of South Africans fighting for ISIS,88 not all recruits 
join the group as fighters. ISIS’s online recruitment 
campaign is largely focused on its ‘governance’ and 
building a caliphate for all Muslims.89 Findings suggest 
that many South Africans who joined ISIS did so in order 
to live in a state that they regarded as truly Islamic and 
governed by ISIS’ interpretation of Shariah law.90 
Regarding the concern raised over individuals who have 
returned from ISIS and whether their return was aimed at 
recruiting other South Africans or possibly coordinating 
attacks in the country, findings suggested that those who 
returned did so as a result of being disillusioned with ISIS 
and the harsh reality of life in ISIS territory. Respondents 
pointed out that many returnees were women and 
children not engaged in active combat. 
Security and law enforcement officials, along with other 
members of the government, confirmed that returnees 
were extensively debriefed and remain under surveillance. 
Respondents also stated that the cases were isolated 
and that a downward trend was now evident.91 This is 
likely in the context of ISIS’s weakening state due to 
military defeats and territorial losses over the course of 
2016. It is worth considering that those who returned 
(within a short period of time) may have served as a 
deterrent to other South Africans contemplating joining 
the group. There are, however, new concerns around 
those who may be forced to return in the event that ISIS 
collapses. The dynamics around such individuals may be 
vastly different to willing returnees, especially if they have 
been involved in the group as combatants, exposed to 
widespread violence.
A minority of respondents expressed the belief that there 
was a significant risk of South Africa being attacked by 
international extremist groups. As is the case with far-right 
extremism, most respondents agreed that the possibility 
of lone-wolf attacks was of greater concern. The changing 
nature of extremist groups, however, means that this could 
change. For instance, while ISIS has shown relatively 
little interest in South Africa until now, as the group 
comes under strain – and as it becomes more difficult 
to perpetrate attacks in the US or Europe – it may seek 
to launch attacks on new targets to maintain relevance. 
Considering South Africa’s abundance of foreign interests 
and its position as Africa’s most industrialised economy, it 
may be considered an attractive target. 
A minority of respondents also claimed that there were links 
between foreign nationals in South Africa and al-Shabaab, 
although little evidence was presented to substantiate 
such claims. A respondent who believed the threat of 
violent extremism to be high stated that evidence had been 
presented to prosecuting authorities in South Africa but 
that no action had been taken due to ‘a lack of properly 
trained prosecutors to handle cases of this magnitude’.92 
Experts, however, contend that this is inaccurate and point 
to the Okah case in explaining the capacity and capability of 
prosecuting authorities to deal with cases of terrorism.93 
A minority of respondents stated that militant 
indoctrination was taking place within close-knit 
communities and mosques.94 However, no verifiable 
reports exist to substantiate such claims. Conversely, 
the various bodies representing Muslim theologians 
in South Africa have issued directives to Islamic 
institutions across the country to responsibly engage 
communities on issues of fundamentalism. These 
bodies have also been advised to review the language 
used in mosques to prevent the misinterpretation 
of religious tenets and warned against the usage of 
potentially extreme rhetoric.95 
South Africa’s lack of interventionist 
policies may mean that extremist groups 
do not consider the country a target
11SOUTHERN AFRICA REPORT 7  | MAY 2017
Respondents noted that in the South African context, radicalisation had 
largely taken place in online forums. They indicated that a small number 
of ISIS recruiters were attempting to recruit in South Africa, but that there 
was no evidence to suggest that such efforts were large-scale or being 
coordinated within religious institutions. 
Government responses to date
Despite occasional claims by foreign governments and the media of 
government complacency over the threat of violent extremism, there 
is evidence that various departments and agencies have policies 
and strategies in place aimed at addressing the threat. A number of 
departments have been active on the issue and have been working with 
other departments on addressing the threat. 
Up to now, government officials have not necessarily sought to discredit 
claims relating to the threat of violent extremism, but rather have stressed 
that the threat is lower than claimed.96 Misconceptions around whether 
the government is dealing with the threat have at times stemmed from a 
lack of government communication on the issue.
Findings indicate that there is ongoing cooperation between South Africa 
and other governments in addressing threats, including the sharing 
of intelligence. However, respondents largely expressed the view that 
cooperation could be improved. There is evidence that, where tangible 
information has come to light, the government has taken measures 
to curb extremist activity. It displayed this capability in the arrests of 
suspected recruits such as the Thulsie brothers in 2016, which also 
indicated that investigations into possible threats are being carried out. 
The South African government has also shown appreciation for the fact 
that not all returnees may have been engaged in combatant roles, and 
that many returnees were women and children. Here it has not employed 
automatic responses that would lead to arrests or prosecution. In the light 
of concerns around the threat that ISIS returnees may pose, respondents 
reported that the government has nonetheless maintained surveillance of 
the returnees. 
Respondents explained that the government had adopted a measured 
approach and endeavoured to involve communities rather than alienate 
them. This is possibly as a result of the South African government’s 
recognition of the failures of other governments in this regard, with the 
preferred approach being one of ‘persuasion rather than prosecution’.97 
The state has thus sought to hand over a measure of responsibility to 
communities. In meetings with community representatives, State Security 
Minister David Mahlobo explained that because recruits were primarily 
motivated by religious or ideological factors, communities were best 
placed to counter radical narratives.98 The government also exhibited 
an awareness that community leaders may have greater influence over 
communities and an understanding of how they function.99 
MANY SA’S WHO JOINED 
ISIS WANTED TO LIVE 
IN AN ISLAMIC STATE 
OSTENSIBLY GOVERNED 
BY SHARIAH LAW
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An important consequence of this approach is that 
the government has fostered greater cooperation and 
inclusivity by involving communities in its strategies. Also 
commendable is the fact that the government’s approach 
has been mindful of human rights considerations, and it 
has avoided both the stigmatisation of groups and the 
use of heavy-handed tactics in dealing with suspects, 
which have been shown to exacerbate the challenge of 
violent extremism in many instances. 
Emerging areas of concern
Youth issues
Internationally, evidence indicates that young people 
are a specific vulnerable group requiring attention in 
relation to radicalisation and recruitment.100 South Africa 
has recently witnessed youth discontent that should 
be taken into account in the context of this discussion. 
This discontent has largely been fuelled by high levels of 
inequality and unemployment. There are also increasing 
perceptions of marginalisation resulting from a lack of 
economic transformation, which has left youth feeling 
betrayed by the promise of a democratic South Africa 
that has not lived up to expectations.101 These issues are 
aggravated by a large youth population that is largely 
poorly educated, unskilled and unemployed.102 
Although these factors may not necessarily result in 
violent extremism in the form that presents now in the 
global context, respondents agree that they have the 
potential to manifest in violence of some form, as is 
evident in the increasing number of violent protests 
throughout South Africa.103 Questions have been raised 
around whether some of the violence seen in the student 
protests could constitute extremism.104 
The premeditated nature of some of the violence, as seen 
in the preparation of petrol bombs, raises the question 
as to whether these incidents indicate the intention 
and active effort by individuals or groups to incite fear 
as a tactic to achieve political ends. Further, violent 
rhetoric and threats directed at certain race groups raise 
questions around deeper underlying issues at the core of 
the student protests. There are also concerns that radical 
groups or elements may seek to take advantage of 
legitimate grievances to forward their agendas, as is often 
the case with extremist groups. 
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Social cohesion 
South Africa’s democratic, post-apartheid era has seen increased 
cohesion between communities and a transformation in social relations 
across racial, cultural and linguistic lines. Despite this progress, marked 
divisions remain and relations appear more strained during times of 
political or economic uncertainty. Strong racial, tribal and socioeconomic 
divisions are still evident, leading to questions around identity and 
disturbances in terms of societal cohesion. Research indicates that a 
breakdown in societal cohesion may contribute to the enabling factors 
surrounding violent extremism.107 
Respondents to this study raised concerns over various fringe groups in 
South Africa and their potential to sow social discord. They contended 
that extremist rhetoric employed by such groups was not always 
recognised as such. The Mazibuye African Forum was noted as being one 
such group. Premised on the notion that South Africa belongs exclusively 
to indigenous populations, the group espouses strong anti-Indian 
sentiments.108 Although there is no evidence to suggest that such groups 
are organising in a strategic or militant fashion, there is concern that they 
may incite large-scale violence through their militant rhetoric.
Impact on communities 
The global war on terror and the media narratives emerging from this 
period have heavily influenced perceptions around extremism globally, 
South Africa included. As in other parts of the world, violent extremism 
has proven to be a divisive force, leading to the ‘othering’ of communities. 
Although not on the same scale seen in Europe or the US, some signs 
of strain are worth noting. In 2016 tensions in a Pretoria suburb ran 
high around the building of a mosque in a former exclusively white 
neighbourhood.109 Many opposed to the project voiced concerns around 
Shariah law taking over the suburb and went as far as to say that ISIS was 
not welcome in the area. While some dismissed the furore as racism (a 
phenomenon not uncommon in South Africa), questions were raised as to 
whether Islamophobia was in fact on the rise.110 
Weak reporting in the media has contributed to this challenge. For 
example, the Daily Maverick published a piece in 2013 containing a 
number of serious allegations around violent extremism in South Africa. 
The piece alleged, despite a lack of evidence, that South Africans were 
making financial contributions to al-Qaeda and had established training 
camps within the country, ostensibly to train fighters for al-Qaeda. The 
story contained various factual inaccuracies and the Daily Maverick 
Evidence indicates that young people are a specific 
vulnerable group requiring attention in relation to 
radicalisation and recruitment
RADICAL GROUPS MAY 
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF 
LEGITIMATE GRIEVANCES TO 
FORWARD THEIR AGENDAS
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proceeded to retract the story and issued a public 
apology to individuals named in the piece.111 The 
after-effects of these allegations remained, however, 
with the story being consistently repeated in the years 
since. A respondent to this study gave an account 
detailing severe harassment experienced as a result of 
these allegations.112  
Equally concerning is the tendency to draw links 
between extremism and foreign nationals in South 
Africa, without evidence to substantiate such notions. 
This is especially worrying in light of South Africa’s 
recent history of xenophobia and the potential 
repercussions that such allegations may have. 
Conclusion 
Although South Africa has not experienced an attack 
in many years, it is clear that it is not immune to 
the threat of violent extremism. The South African 
case is unique and illustrative of the complexities 
surrounding the threat of violent extremism. Factors 
driving radicalisation and extremist activity vary 
from group to group and thus indicate the need for 
nuanced responses. 
While Pagad and far-right groups have been spurred 
on by ideology, structural issues, marginalisation 
and social conditions, the South Africans who have 
travelled to ISIS were not marginalised members of 
society, nor did they suffer from relative deprivation. 
This is why emerging threats from non-traditional 
actors need to be considered.
While the issue should be taken seriously and 
monitored, other issues may take priority over violent 
extremism. South Africa’s high crime rate is one such 
issue. Many respondents to this study cited greater 
concern over the other forms of violence seen in South 
Africa, such as xenophobia, unabated gang violence 
on the Cape Flats, the violent nature of farm attacks 
and violent protests across the country.
South Africa should, however, not become complacent. 
The changing nature of extremist groups should 
particularly be monitored. With the loss of territory in Iraq 
and Syria and the increasing difficulty of perpetrating 
attacks in Europe or the US, ISIS may look to expand 
its range of operations. This may make countries such 
as South Africa more attractive options with relatively 
high-value targets, such as various Western interests 
and symbols representative of capitalism or ‘Western 
imperialism’, that may be easier to target than heavily 
protected European countries or the US. 
There is, however, little indication that this is currently 
the case and the threat of violent extremism in South 
Africa is still considered to be low. The conditions 
that have been shown to lead to extremism in other 
countries are prevalent in South Africa. The availability 
of weapons and explosives means that the threat posed 
by international extremist groups is largely a question 
of intent, which was previously found to be lacking. 
Although the threat appears to be minimal, the far-
reaching ramifications of a potential attack mean that it 
should be considered seriously and carefully monitored.
Recommendations
Understand the threat of violent extremism
Considering the evolutionary nature of violent 
extremism and the threat that it increasingly poses 
globally, efforts need to be made by both the 
government and civil society should try to better 
understand the complexities around the issue. This 
could be facilitated by investing in research.
Strengthen government’s response capacities 
In light of the evolution of extremist threats and the 
fact that South Africa has not experienced a terrorist 
attack in many years, the country’s ability to respond 
is untested. To avoid being caught off-guard, capacity 
needs to be developed in terms of intelligence 
capabilities, strengthening the knowledge of officials 
on the drivers of violent extremism, and strengthening 
skills and readiness to handle actual incidents.
Address corruption
Corruption, along with related organised crime, needs 
to be recognised for its role in facilitating extremist 
activities and should be addressed accordingly. The 
Department of Home Affairs, the Directorate for Priority 
Crime Investigation, the National Prosecuting Authority 
and the SAPS need to work towards more effective 
anti-corruption measures, with a strong emphasis on 
the implementation of policies. 
South Africa is not immune to the threat 
of violent extremism
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Foster inclusivity and social cohesion
Extremist groups often turn to violence to achieve their aims when 
they are unable to work through established political institutions. 
Political inclusivity is possible through the development of and support 
for democratic institutions that allow for grievances to be addressed 
peacefully. Institutions must be responsive to the concerns of citizens and 
the government must be accountable to the people. 
Engage the youth 
Given the concerns currently relating to youth in South Africa, the country 
needs to do what it can to ensure that this group does not become 
a focus of recruitment and radicalisation. Youth must be encouraged 
to move towards constructive and responsible engagement with the 
government and broader society. Equally, the government and civil society 
must be responsive and willing to engage on youth concerns. Education 
is key in ensuring the development of young people and harnessing their 
potential and providing them with prospects for the future. Education is 
not limited to institutions and needs to take place within the home and 
community as well. 
Strengthen international engagement and cooperation
Maintaining good relations and enhancing cooperation with other states 
and foreign security agencies should be prioritised, especially considering 
the transnational nature of violent extremism. This includes playing a role 
in the global discussion on addressing the threat and promoting the use of 
measured responses in line with the rule of law and human rights.
Work with communities
The government and communities should continue to work together 
to address challenges around radicalisation and recruitment. Dialogue 
between communities should be promoted as a way to increase 
awareness and foster greater understanding and social cohesion. 
Community leaders should use their platforms to promote constructive 
messages as a way to counter extremist rhetoric that may be affecting 
South Africans, particularly the youth. 
Government communication
While secrecy is understood to be necessary in ongoing investigations 
for sensitive matters, more public communications are needed to foster 
trust and alleviate fears. By its very nature, terrorism intends to heighten 
fear, which more transparency may serve to alleviate. If the psychological 
effects of terrorism are not addressed through alleviating fears, efforts to 
ensure physical security are undermined. 
Encourage responsible media coverage 
On the part of the media, greater responsibility should be exercised, as 
sensationalist reporting can exaggerate threats, foster fear and encourage 
harmful discrimination. Responsible reporting is necessary to provide 
accurate information. 
THE CHANGING NATURE 
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